This year, the CCP congress marks the 20th anniversary of the CCP elections with a familiar candidate, Xi Jinping. Elected as the president of China in the year 2012 and has persisted ever since Xi Jinping now attempts to cement his sovereignty with a third try at the presidency. Experts on Chinese politics estimate that the election would go along as Xi would expect, but as some obstacles emerge as an unignorable threat to Xi's extension of power, it seems to many observers that his third regime hangs by a thread.

Political instability within China is often mentioned as one of the sources of Xi's loss of authority within the CCP. One of the main sources of criticism is the implementation of the Zero COVID policy in China such as the Shanghai lockdown from February to August this year. Zero COVID policy, as it is a type of political tactic rather than an original Chinese policy, can be generally labeled as a political strategy that enacts stringent lockdowns and movement restrictions to keep cases as low as possible.

On October 15th, BBC reported an anonymous protest in China condemning Xi Jinping on a highway in Beijing. Reports are assuming that the main reason behind the protest is societal frustration as a response to the harsh 'Zero COVID policy ("China Protest").' This protest had some precursors as there were various protests and demonstrations shouting for the governmental lockdown to be brought down.

However, what distinguishes this protest from others is the timing. Most of the protests held in China were hardly initiated during a political election as citizens and police officers – i.e., Gong'an (公安) – are extremely cautious to avoid any troubles that might distress the government officials. The severity of the protest is also very exceptional as the plank card contained words directly expressing a sense of hatred against the Xi regime. The response from Xi Jinping, in contrast, obstinately remains still; Xi, through his official commentary through People's Daily Online (i.e, 人民日报), justified his policy as "the inevitable choice to safeguard the fundamental interests of the people."

The damage of the Zero COVID policy to the Chinese economy should also be taken into account when evaluating the Xi regime. According to Wright and Kratz, the GDP per capita of China declined by 5.8 percent during the two years of the COVID epidemic. Bloomberg economic magazine acknowledges that more than 30 percent of China's economic decline is responsible for the Zero COVID policy ("China's Consumer Woes"). Even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warned of China's severe economic punishment. These charts all accumulate and attach rapidly with the outcome measurement of Xi's regime for the past two reelections as the CCP chairman.

Differences can be drawn from former leaders, Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong, the CCP that Xi attempts to extend the political scope and propaganda onto an international scale. The Belt Road Initiative (BRI) manifests Xi's intention to increase China's soft power and global awareness as a leading country in Eastern Asia.

Nevertheless, even the BRI blueprints are starting to smudge as countries that formerly participated in the initiative are showing discouraging results. One quintessential example can be found in Sri Lanka where BRI officials intend to build the port of Hambantota, leaving a colossal amount of debt to the Sri Lanka government and the handing of 80% joint venture of the port with the Chinese government; "Sri Lanka serves as a warning to those interested in Chinese strategic influence.”

Experts believe that the Belt Road Initiative stems from a long-term desire for China to earn international acclaim as a dissatisfied state – a state who feels that its influence, status, and material benefits should be higher than what they are actually achieving. Though international acclaim and the acknowledgment of China's soft power vary from each state, the majority of actions held during the Xi regime do not appear as a pleasant outlook on Xi Jinping. Struggles of protests and demonstrations replenish every month and the new political candidate Li Keqiang - the primer of the state council - rises as a potential threat to Xi Jinping (the example of how Li presents himself as a potential threat can be found in his recent criticism against Xi Jinping's Zero COVID policy.)

Xi is now in an embroiled situation where he must resolve a complex string of clashes within and beyond China to manifest his clear political strength. The third time's the charm, yet instability boils as the burdening responsibility of sustaining third consecutive career mounts as a possible engine to Xi's descension of power. Now with the election, the snowball rolls from the mountaintop of Chinese politics, and one thing is sure: Xi's actions will either move mountains of CCP or end up as a political avalanche with Xi on its bottom.